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## **THE GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE CENTER: A VEHICLE FOR TRANSITIONING TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT**

**Raymond A. Millen  
Carolyn Pruitt**

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>MAY 2011</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>The Government Assistance Center: A Vehicle for Transitioning to the Host Government</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 22 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA, 17013</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>74</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

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**Raymond A. Millen  
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**May 2011**

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ISBN: 978-0-9833514-2-9

## FOREWORD

Policy-makers and strategists have long recognized that complexity and chaos are common features of the strategic environment, which encompasses both the international and domestic realms. In war, the military seeks to mitigate these features through superb organization and staff-work, among other pursuits. Unfortunately, outside of the military, this same discipline is not applied to other endeavors, such as Security Sector Reform, Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance.

In this monograph, Professor Raymond Millen proposes a way for non-military organizations to render assistance and development to fragile states through an organizational approach. Accordingly, he proffers the concept of the Government Assistance Center as a vehicle for effective coordination and cooperation in Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches. Conceptually, the Government Assistance Center embodies a standardized camp and an organizational structure for decision-making.


The standardized camp has an expeditionary capability, using state-of-the-art barrier and shelter systems. Standardized camps permit diverse organizations and agencies to interface with one another as well as with the host government in an orderly manner. In this sense, it epitomizes the government-in-a-box concept. Due to their standardized design, Government Assistance Centers have the same capabilities regardless of the contributing nations and organizations involved. Their expeditionary character permits Government Assistance Centers to deploy into remote countries and become operational within days. More-

over, Centers may re-locate within a country quickly, adapting to dynamic changes.

The most interesting feature of the Government Assistance Center is the integrated decision-making apparatus. This unique capability permits the formulation of policy and strategy to occur within the host nation, leading to more practical and germane solutions to national and local issues. The integrated nature of the apparatus encourages cooperation and coordination of participating organizations and agencies, injecting their expertise on issues which concern them. In praxis, this is smart power to the nth degree.

Professor Millen concludes his study with points for consideration regarding prevalent issues which confront practitioners, and he briefly discusses how the UN might place Government Assistance Centers into practice. Ultimately, the monograph provides a way for Whole of Government and the Comprehensive approaches to succeed without excessive dependency on the U.S. Army's skill sets.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of consideration and debate among the government and international communities.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Cliff D. Crofford, Jr." in a cursive style.

CLIFF D. CROFFORD, Jr.  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director, U.S. Army Peacekeeping  
and Stability Operations Institute

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen (retired) is currently the Security Sector Reform analyst at the Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Institute, Carlisle, PA. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, and later as a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. He held a variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States. At the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, he served as the Director of European Security Studies, producing studies on NATO, Afghanistan, and counterinsurgency. Professor Millen served three tours in Afghanistan first, from July through November 2003 on the staff of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, focusing on the Afghan National Army and the General staff; second with Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan from August 2006 to August 2007 establishing police coordination centers in northern Afghanistan; and third from September 2008 to September 2009 as an MPRI Senior Mentor for the Afghan Assistant Ministry of Defense for Strategy and Plans. Mr. Millen has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals to include *Parameters*, *Joint Special Warfare Journal*, *Small Wars Journal*, *Comparative Strategy Journal*, *Infantry Magazine*, and the *Swiss Military Journal*. The second edition of his book, *Command Legacy*, was published by Potomac Books in December 2008. Professor Millen is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University, as well as an M.A. degree in World Politics and a Ph.D. (ABD) in Political Science from Catholic University of America.

## SUMMARY

The international community needs to take a new approach regarding assistance and development ventures for fragile states. Few would quarrel with the view that current methods are incredibly expensive, wasteful, susceptible to corruption and less than effective in the long run. Much is written about the necessity of Security Sector Reform, Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance as the means to lifting struggling states out of the pit of despair. However, the vast majority of the literature only numbs the reader with laundry lists of goals, considerations, and requirements; little is written on how to organize the assistance effort.

There is also a large assumption, not borne out by practice, that cooperation and coordination among states, among organizations, and even among domestic agencies are frictionless if they all share a common goal. Moreover, the literature on Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches (defined in the study) suggests unity of effort among partners is a given. In practice, states and organizations do not subordinate their interests to other interests easily, so unity of effort often suffers correspondingly. Recent experience in Afghanistan, particularly in regards to provincial reconstruction teams, offers a possible solution to this dilemma.

This monograph proposes the establishment of a new unifying assistance and development organization to help fragile states and is divided into five sections. The first section briefly examines the challenges associated with Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches as well as with provincial reconstruction teams. The section concludes with the



introduction of an organizational paradigm, the Government Assistance Center, designed to amalgamate the efforts of all participating donors (states, nongovernment organizations, international organizations, government organizations, etc.), rendering assistance and development to fragile states at various echelons of government.

The second and third sections address the organizational aspects of the Government Assistance Center. Section two proposes a standardized camp design, which offers a routinized way for donors physically to come together and interface with the host government. The expeditionary design of the Government Assistance Center permits swift access to fragile states without regard to existing infrastructure, heavy equipment, and specialized personnel. The third section describes the essential purpose of the Government Assistant Center and introduces the integrated decision-making mechanism, which consists of an integrated planning board, a council, and an implementation coordination board. Transcending the activities of a normal headquarters, the mechanism emulates the interagency process and seeks innovative, tailored solutions to complex problems plaguing a fragile state.

The fourth section involves issues and caveats which Government Assistance Centers must consider as they deliberate policy and strategy. In this regard, the Center's council must consider the possible unintended consequences of policies, strategies, and programs when implementing Security Sector Reform (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration; Rule of Law, Military reform, Police reform, and Economic reform), Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response, and Counterinsurgency.

The fifth section proposes a framework in which the Government Assistance Centers can be placed into practice. Fundamentally, the framework heralds an innovative, more efficient method for helping fragile states: greater and more equitable burden-sharing among donor states; a mode for all donors, regardless of size and resources, to make more meaningful contributions; and a path to end the over-reliance on the military for such ventures.

Ultimately, there should be no illusions regarding the proposal. The international environment is complex, random, and chaotic. The domestic environment of host nations requiring assistance is no less so. The Government Assistance Center paradigm is designed to provide assistance to fragile states without suffering the historical exorbitant costs, wastage, and unmanageable corruption. Each Center offers a way for international actors to coordinate their actions and cooperate synergistically. The interagency process mechanism institutionalizes creative thinking for problem solving as well as strategic thinking for policy and strategy development. Finally, Government Assistance Centers underscore the sincere commitment of the international community to break the cycle of dysfunctional governance.

# **THE GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE CENTER: A VEHICLE FOR TRANSITIONING TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT**

**By Raymond A Millen and Carolyn Pruitt**

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## The Collision of Concepts with Reality

Rendering assistance to fragile states is hardly a new undertaking for non-government organizations, the United Nations, and the United States, so the implementation of stability and humanitarian operations should have reached a rather high level of proficiency by now.\* The reality is less stellar due to the inherent complexities of state interventions and the number of diverse actors involved. Yet, no prudent alternatives are available. Security Sector Reform, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs, Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance require donors and partners. Without such contributors, the United Nations would be reduced to the status of figurehead, and if the United States tried to go it alone, it would inevitably exhaust its economy and mental stamina as well as risking the legitimacy of its actions. Winston Churchill captured the dilemma writing, "There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies – And that is to fight without them." So why is it so difficult to work together? The answer is paradoxically both simple and complex.

Within the U.S. federal bureaucracy, it is well understood that differences in organizational cultures handicap cooperation and coordination of policy for-

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\*Since 1992, the United States has participated in a number of peace operations: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan (though the last two morphed into counterinsurgencies). Added to these recent experiences is a long history of peace and occupation operations: post-Civil War Reconstruction, Philippines, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama among others.

mulation and implementation. As strategic theorist Rich Yarger explains:

Various departments and agencies are organized differently and each tends to have its own organizational culture. That is, each has a set of organizational beliefs and assumptions that color what they perceive and how they think and feel about the issues. Organizational theory argues these manifest themselves in the way organizations behave, react, and interact externally, such as mission, goals, and control systems, and internally, such as language, norms of behavior, recognition, censure and status, and power relationships. Thus, each organization has its own values and norms and its own physical, behavioral, and verbal manifestations. It gets more complicated because large organizations have subcultures within them.<sup>1</sup>

Differences in cultures and interests become even more pronounced when a nation state collaborates with other nation states, international organizations, civil society organizations, and host nation governments. In view of these obstacles, it would seem logical that a more unilateralist approach, either by a single nation state or an organization, is a more efficient and effective means of engaging fragile states. However, unilateralism is usually reserved for instances of vital national interests, and assistance operations rarely if ever falls into that realm.

### **Whole of Government and Comprehensive Approaches**

For reasons of funding, limited capacity, multiple priorities, and legitimacy, multilateral approaches to international problems have become the accepted

norm of foreign relations. Predictably, the U.S. government, in its role as a global leader, has embarked on conceptualizing multilateral solutions for fragile state dysfunctions. Embracing two approaches, the Whole of Government and the Comprehensive, the United States seeks to create greater unity of effort not only among U.S. government departments and agencies, but also between the U.S. government and international partners. Articulated in FM 3-07 (*Stability Operations*), the Whole of Government approach “integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.” The emphasis is on collaborative planning for the purpose of “achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress,” as well as the sharing of limited resources (i.e., financial, military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communications). Similarly, the Comprehensive approach “integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.”<sup>2†</sup> In essence, both approaches imply the use of a loose, interagency-like framework to promote greater collaboration among donors as well as between donors and the host country.

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<sup>†</sup> For simplicity in this monograph, the term, U.S. agencies, is used to mean all U.S. departments and agencies. The term, donors, is used to include the United States, other nation states, intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN, NATO, OAS, etc.), supranational organizations (e.g., EU, World Trade Organization, etc.), private sector firms, private volunteer organizations, contractors, nongovernmental organizations (e.g., ICRC, Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, etc.) and others involved in assistance and development ventures.



There seems to be a fairly wide gulf between the articulated approaches and practical results though. A successful interagency process entails more than conducting meetings, exchanging information, and setting milestones. Unity of effort – the purpose of the process – is the product of consensus and cooperation. Consensus is a general agreement (not complete) on a decision. Cooperation is the willingness and ability to work together towards a common goal. If both consensus and cooperation are complete, then synergistic effects directed at an objective suffers little friction. Deficiencies in one or both may have a severe impact on the success of an enterprise though. If a partner disagrees with any aspect of a policy or strategy, the motivation to accomplish supporting goals may suffer, especially if that partner begins to experience challenges. Even if consensus is 100 percent, insufficient cooperation may doom the undertaking. Here, differences in organizational culture and interests, personality conflicts, misunderstandings, and so on significantly degrade unity of effort disproportionately.

These differences are daunting but by no means insurmountable. As militaries over millennia have long recognized and strived to perfect, organization is the most efficient and effective way to achieve results. In pursuit of war, organizational structures, procedures, and processes are indispensable. Correspondingly, the pursuit of assistance and development enterprises are no less complex and sometimes even more so. Hence, most problems associated with consensus and cooperation are organizational in nature. Achieving sufficient unity of effort from a diverse collection of donors is simply unlikely with a decision-making system based on informal, ad hoc arrangements. Seeking greater efficiencies through better organization is

a logical recourse, but the idea does not enjoy strong appeal outside of the military because of misconceptions about bureaucracy. President Dwight Eisenhower captured this dilemma in the public realm, pointing out that people erroneously associate organization with rigid bureaucracy:

To the adult mind “organization” seems to summon visions of rigidity and machine-like operation, with an inescapable deadly routine and stodginess in human affairs. Yet it is not the enemy of imagination or of any other attractive human characteristic. Its purpose is to simplify, clarify, expedite, and coordinate; it is the bulwark against chaos, confusion, delay, and failure.<sup>3</sup>

To re-emphasize, organization is not defined by meetings dedicated to the exchange of information and issuing of tasks; nor is frenetic activity a sign of effective organization. Eisenhower suggested that organization required a more expansive, holistic approach—a mechanism which integrated the ideas of practitioners and subject matter experts, permitted candid debate on policy issues and strategy, and assisted in the coordination and implementation of policy decisions. In addition to producing effective policy and strategy, the process as Eisenhower viewed it fostered consensus building and cooperation through the inculcation of teamwork and camaraderie.

In view of Eisenhower’s exceptional command experience during and after World War II, it is not surprising that the U.S. interagency process reached its peak under his Administration’s National Security Council mechanism.<sup>4</sup>

The logic of this mechanism is so profound that this study (in the interagency process mechanism section) makes use of it as the means to invigorate the Whole of Government and the Comprehensive approaches.<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, the Government Assistance Center is the vehicle for an integrated decision-making apparatus to function within the host nation.

Some skeptics might view an interagency-like paradigm as unsuited for the Comprehensive approach, suggesting that time honored arrangements, such as ad hoc coalitions and alliances, are sufficient to achieve greater unity of effort and efficiencies. This is mostly a romanticized view of cooperation among donor nations and organizations. Invariably, coalitions and alliances fall short of expectations, primarily due to divergent national interests, organizational agendas, cultural norms, and strategic viewpoints, as well as the tendency of smaller partners to sub-optimize contributions.<sup>6</sup>

Even during World War II, the Western Allies in Europe experienced substantial rifts which threatened to undermine the war effort, and this despite complete agreement on the strategic goal of defeating Germany.<sup>7</sup>

As addressed earlier, other factors intrude on cooperation and consensus; being part of a coalition does not suppress this behavior.

Indubitably, intrusions in the domestic affairs of other states in the form of Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR), Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance require just as much organization as a military campaign so as to create order and synchrony of activities as well as enhancing the development of policy and strategy. Interventions impose tremendous demands on both donors and the host nation. Reforms and assistance create winners and losers in a host country, result in first and second order of effects (i.e., unintended consequences), and can make the host nation even more fragile; so donors must have a unified policy and strategy to anticipate problems and opportunities as well as to shape favorable outcomes.

In terms of an organizational approach, the provincial reconstruction team framework provides a starting point from which to craft an expeditionary capability for Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches.

## **Provincial Reconstruction Teams – a Good Start**

The original intent of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Afghanistan was to provide security so that development and construction programs could take place in a permissive environment. They were designed as an interim structure to help improve stability by building up the capacity of the Afghan government to govern, enhance economic viability, and deliver essential public services (e.g., security, law and order, justice, health care, and education).<sup>8</sup>

The Teams offered a way for the bulk of U.S. coalition partners and friends to contribute to the assistance effort short of war fighting. As provincial reconstruction teams were a novel initiative, the organizational structure was rather loose and varied from donor country to donor country. In 2005, analyst Peter Jakobsen wrote that the basic PRT structure comprised a headquarters, a civil affairs (CA) team, a civilian-led reconstruction team, an engineer unit, a security unit, military observer teams, interpreters, and a medical team.<sup>9</sup>

Although more U.S. agencies (e.g., Department of State, USAID, and U.S. Department of Agriculture) have since joined PRTs, the camps are essentially run by the military.

In Afghanistan, cooperation between PRTs and international/nongovernmental organizations has suffered, partly due to the military semblance of PRTs and partly due to the competition generated by the


provision of goods and services to local communities. According to Barbara Stapleton of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, development and assistance organizations are reluctant to associate with the military for fear of endangering their neutral status.<sup>10</sup>

As Jakobsen observed, due to criticism and pressure from the UN and humanitarian organizations, the United States curtailed PRT provision of Humanitarian Assistance and reconstruction as well as quick impact projects. Even civil affairs teams had to limit their activities with the civilian population because their use of civilian clothes and vehicles blurred the distinction between the military and civilian agencies.<sup>11</sup>

Aside from this diminished cooperation, another frustration for ISAF headquarters (NATO's International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan is the inconsistent performance among provincial reconstruction teams. Whereas a U.S. PRT can depend on powerful military forces (i.e., Brigade Combat Teams) in its area of operation for security, an allied PRT has only a small security contingent (a platoon of around thirty soldiers) and a very limited capacity for much of anything. Consequently, the ability of allied PRTs to support development and assistance programs is significantly circumscribed by insufficient capabilities. On top of that, allied PRTs take instructions primarily from their home governments in the form of national caveats, so unity of effort among is basically an illusion.<sup>12</sup>

The provincial reconstruction team framework represents a solid foundation for the next generation of assistance efforts, but changes are needed. Clearly, a future organization needs to be disassociated with the current term, which connotes a limited mandate and too close an association with the military. Hence,

a clean-slate designator is needed to encourage partnering with various organizations. The term “Government Assistant Center” is apt since it conveys a unified purpose with the intent of helping states help themselves. A further proposal is to break the overuse of acronyms, using the abbreviated “Center” rather than GAC.



**Figure 1. Levels of Government Assistance Centers**


Ideally, the organizational design of a Government Assistance Center enhances the international community’s ability to render assistance to fragile states quickly, permits greater collaboration and coordination among engaged actors, and establishes a framework for the integrated staff process to function effectively. A national level Center always deploys first to engage the host government, develop policy and strategy, and provide guidance on ends, ways, and means to subordinate Centers arriving later. The number of subordinate Centers required largely depends on the mission, complexity, and geographic size of the host nation (Figure 1). In some cases, two subordinate Centers may suffice to support a mission, such as DDR programs; in other cases, dozens of subordinate Centers may be needed to support a larger effort (i.e., counterinsurgency). Fundamentally, the success of the Government Assis-

tance Center initiative depends on the number of willing contributors, not only to share the burden, but also to gain greater acceptance by fragile states. As the next section argues, a Center's organizational effectiveness and efficiency are a product of both the physical structure and the organizational process.

## **Standardized Camp Design**

Similar to provincial reconstruction teams, Centers are organized into camps because they have several distinct advantages over other methods of deploying into a country. Camps can be built rapidly on undeveloped land in or near the national and provincial capitals. This precludes the need to locate and rent office space, classrooms and other facilities from the host nation infrastructure.

The establishment of camps is the international community's first demonstrable commitment of assistance to a host country. The manner in which the camp is constructed and laid-out should create a favorable impression on the host government and the populace. To this end, the construction effort should be highly organized and prompt; the camp should be logically designed, clean, and functional. One of Imperial Rome's great legacies was the army camp, which symbolized the organizational power of Rome. Like seeds planted throughout the empire, hundreds of Roman camps grew into cities over time, a remarkable phenomenon.<sup>13</sup> Likewise, Government Assistance Center camps should have a standardized design and a dedicated engineer support package with the goal of establishing a functioning Center in a matter of days (Figure 2).<sup>14</sup> Establishing a physical presence is a discipline, which requires thorough preparation. The camp is a reflection of the Center's professionalism



**Support Center Main Facilities:**

1. Main Office Complex\*
2. Maintenance Facility
3. Motor Pool/Parking areas
4. Administration Offices
5. Living Quarters
6. Dining Facilities
7. Warehouse
8. Generators
9. Internet Center
10. Clinic and Visitors Quarters
11. Medical Clinic
12. Shower and Bath facilities
13. Ceremony Ground/sports field
14. Multi-purpose complex
15. Cargo Unloading Area
16. Convoy Access Gate
17. Pedestrian Entrance
18. Service Road

- 58 by 58 foot re-locatable
- 33 by 35 foot re-locatable (750 - Personnel bed down)
- 15 by 60 containerized wash and bath unit
- 13 by 15 foot re-locatable
- Expansion Capacity

**Figure 2. Standardized Camp Design**



The use of commercial quick-assembly perimeter barriers, shelter systems, and plastic floorboards for all camp facilities represents a leap forward in establishing camps quickly. Technological advances in barriers, shelters, and flooring provide users with durable, easy set-up, and configurable systems to meet any need. Because of their light weight and compactness, camp packages can be airlifted into the host nation in a matter of days. Moreover, fewer specialized equipment and people are needed to establish a camp. Barriers and facilities can be easily disassembled and used again as needed.<sup>15</sup> For power, generators provide ample electricity for the camp, precluding the need to use the existing electrical grid (which is usually intermittent and unreliable). Access to assured communications (i.e., cell/satellite phones, internet, and radios) is one of the most powerful tools a Center can provide to its personnel. Maintenance facilities, motor parks, and warehouses provide the necessary logistical support. Extra warehouse capacity is particularly useful for potential Disaster Response and Humanitarian Assistance. The availability of empty warehouses permits the rapid staging of supplies and equipment in the event the host country is affected by a disaster. Consequently, camps should be located near airports or seaports whenever suitable for logistical access.

**Security.** Deployments ranging from Humanitarian Assistance to counterinsurgency require security. Even without an existential security threat, Centers must remain alert to pilferage, robbery, and periodic demonstrations. In this regard, there are two kinds of security tasks—camp security and excursion security. It would be a mistake to try and perform both tasks with one security contingent because the attempt leads to administrative turmoil and overextends the securi-

ty force. Camp security is necessary for the protection of personnel and equipment, but using military forces in this role gives the camp a military character, which in turn might create barriers to cooperation with donor organizations. For this reason, Centers should minimize the military presence so as to encourage the participation of these organizations in camp activities. Consequently, UN designated police forces or private security firms have a more benign image and are more than sufficient to guard a camp.

Security for excursions to different locales, on the other hand, are better handled by military forces since these operations tend to be more complex, requiring tight planning and robust capabilities. Military forces are well adapted to providing security for convoys and local community activities (i.e., medical, construction, Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response, etc.). With the exception of post-conflict periods in the aftermath of an intervention, the UN will likely have the lead in providing security. Even though UN military forces have a more benign image than national military forces, including them in the camp garrison gives the camp a military character. A better arrangement would be to establish a military base nearby and have it interact with the Center as a visitor or as a link-up point with donor organizations.


To ensure a Center functions as envisioned, camp designers need to identify critical offices and facilities. While the following list of offices and facilities are not exhaustive, they represent a solid foundation for a camp.<sup>16</sup>

**Donor and Interagency Process Offices/Rooms.** Offices for representatives from the Departments of State, Justice, and Agriculture (or the equivalent ministries of other countries), USAID, mentor teams

(e.g., ministerial, military, and police), and other donor organizations are essential components of any Center (Figure 3). For the interagency process bodies, two large planning rooms for the integrated planning board and the implementation coordination board are essential to support the interagency process. The council conference room requires a large conference table for the director and advisors as well as space for chairs along the wall. Occupancy should not exceed twenty-five participants though. The interagency support staff requires a large office for about fifty desks with computers as well as a few printers and copiers. The interagency process coordinator and his/her deputy also have desks there.

**Director's Office.** The director chairs the Council of the interagency process mechanism and is the mentor for the host nation executive. The director is expected to make frequent visits to embassies, subordinate Centers, and key organizations. The office should have sufficient room to permit private meetings with visitors and some seclusion so the director can think without interruptions. An anteroom with secretary protects the director from unscheduled visitors.

**Engineer Office.** An integral component of the Center is the engineer office. It oversees the construction of camps, manages contracts, and often employs local labor. Since the engineers are a military asset, the engineer unit should operate from the nearby military camp so as to avoid an overt military association. However, the engineer commander and small staff would be most effective operating from permanent offices in the Center, while the deputy commander and main staff operate out of the military camp.



**Figure 3. Donor Representation to Centers**

According to Colonel Matt Russell, a former Senior Engineer in Iraq (Multi-National Division-North), contracts and construction projects are two critical functions requiring engineer management. Accordingly, the engineer office identifies and manages contracting requirements in order to facilitate construction of base camps. The engineer legal office reviews contracts, submittals, modifications, and any amendments. An integrated approach by the engineer representatives, lawyers and associated contracting personnel enhances timely and accurate construction planning and contracting. Essential as well is the inclusion of local city and facility management engineers from the host nation as early as possible into the contracting and construction process. The participation of host nation engineers from the government and private sectors facilitates and promotes proper and transparent contracting procedures, which help curb corruption and establish equitable labor practices.<sup>17</sup>

For construction projects, the engineer office is most appropriate for interacting with nongovernment, government, and international organizations as well as with local governance officials vis-à-vis construction programs. In this capacity, inspectors from the engineer unit ensure the participating organizations

and officials provide skills training, hire local labor for local projects, and pay fair wage for labor. This approach ensures that local communities retain authority over construction projects and the employment of their own citizens. Moreover, ownership is enhanced when local government officials, city engineers, private construction firms, and the populace are involved in the entire process, from contracting negotiations to the actual construction.

In view of the large number of construction projects, the engineer office is the logical choice for managing them. To this end, a weekly projects coordination meeting provides the opportunity for all donors to submit project proposals and provide updates on current projects. The engineer office can resolve construction conflicts among donor organizations, thereby mitigating redundancies and waste.

**Inspector General Office.** An inspector general office monitors programs and funding, principally as a means of mitigating corruption. Rather than being an endemic problem, it is well to understand that some level of corruption affects every society. Fragile states are normally impoverished, so whenever affluent states deploy into country, it is natural that avarice would grip the host government and population. An unregulated influx of money, even under the auspices of assistance, can exacerbate corruption to unmanageable levels. The inspector general also attends the weekly assistance projects coordination meetings.

**Public Affairs Office.** The good work performed by Centers is of interest to domestic and host nation populations. Successful deployments, widely reported in the media and receiving approval is a superb recruiting tool and an incentive for prospective donor states to contribute to Centers. The public affairs of-

fice enhances national will and legitimacy within the host nation and more broadly among populations internationally. The Center director should consider the impact of the media when formulating policy and strategy, but should take care that public affairs not degenerate into propaganda, since this can backfire and might be illegal.

**Camp Supervisor Office.** The camp supervisor is responsible for camp operations and maintenance. The supervisor is the final arbiter of camp related issues, ensuring the camp runs smoothly. A small staff provides administrative support for directives and communications.

**Land Management Office.** Although it may seem trivial compared to the myriad of tasks engineers must accomplish, land management of the camp becomes a crucial concern as the camp grows. Each camp needs a land management office to plan and monitor camp expansion in an orderly manner. Experience in Afghanistan suggests that inattention to land management can lead to frequent, time-consuming shuffling of offices, facilities, and accommodations as the camp expands.

**Housing Office.** The housing office manages room assignments and guest quarters. Tight control of accommodations lessens the occurrences of squatters, people departing with room keys, over-crowding, and vacant rooms. The number of offices, lavatories, and accommodations is predicated on the mission, but the camp should be large enough to accommodate internal expansion. The housing office collaborates with the land management office when camp expansion is considered.

**Communications Center.** The lifeblood of the Center is communications because access to real-time information is an imperative—knowledge generates

power. The federal level Center requires powerful and varied communications in order to interact with the subordinate Centers operating throughout the host country. Having both FM and AM radios assures communications regardless of terrain restrictions. Satellite linkage is required for internet access, which permits personnel to search for information, email, contact government departments and agencies for queries, teleconferencing, and virtual conference rooms. Cell phones are a convenient way to communicate, but experience suggests that service and coverage might be erratic. Satellite phones are a good back-up, but due to their expense, should only be used when other means of communication are not available. The communications facility requires enough trained radio operators to operate on a 24-hour schedule. The communications facility also creates and issues cards with Center radio frequencies, call-signs, key telephone numbers, and dialing information. As a technique for alerting personnel in the field, the communications facility could use cell phone texting capability for emergency messages and instructions. Lastly, trained information technology technicians are essential to the maintenance of all communications systems.

**Internet Station.** A community internet station is an essential commodity for the Center. The internet permits personnel to conduct independent research, supplementing normal support from their parent organizations. Assistance and development organizations, most notably NGOs, often do not have access to the Internet, so the internet station provides additional incentive for their personnel to visit the Center and collaborate on activities. Host nation officials should be encouraged to use the station for official research and discovery learning. It also provides an opportu-

nity for host government officials to escape the local politics for a while and converse confidentially with their Center mentors or advisors.


**Motor Pool.** The motor pool office manages positive control, security, and maintenance of vehicles. In coordination with the land management office, the motor pool office organizes designated parking spaces as well as the convoy staging area. Without close management of vehicle parking, the fuel point, and dispatch procedures, the camp shall suffer from endless congestion and loss of control over vehicles.

**Supply.** The supply office manages the ordering, receipt, and storage of supplies, including warehouse management. Pilferage, waste, and fraud become rife when supply operations are not closely attended to. Excess warehouses are prudent in anticipation of natural or manmade disasters, requiring the staging of humanitarian relief and assistance. The future is unpredictable, but Centers should anticipate some type of disaster occurring and have the flexibility to react to it. Additionally, a secure area for sensitive items storage containers is needed for safeguarding money, specialized equipment, and ammunition. Safeguarding funds, which can range into the millions of dollars, is an important issue. The camp needs funds for camp maintenance and operations; development and assistance teams need funds for projects; training teams need funds to pay salaries, purchase equipment,

As the preceding paragraphs reveal, a Center requires significant support personnel for the operation and maintenance of a camp. A typical Center should comprise several hundred personnel if Whole of Government and the Comprehensive approach are properly engaged.



## The Raison D'être of Government Assistance Centers



**Figure 4. Center-Host Government Interaction**

In one dimension, Government Assistance Centers permit U.S. government agencies to connect with the host government in a formal, organized manner. In another, other donors (e.g., countries, organizations, groups, etc.) can connect through the Centers and into the host government in a coherent manner as well (Figure 4.). In this sense, Centers are analogous to transformers, which permit electronic devices from one country to work in another country. Centers harmonize and coordinate the plethora of assistance and development efforts proffered to the host nation, all the while ensuring the host nation government is not overwhelmed. Centers permit donors to communicate with one voice (or at least not a cacophony), understand where they fit in the overall strategy, and think like a corporate body. Over and above the rudimentary tasks of assistance, development, and mentoring, Centers engage in strategic and critical thinking. They formulate policies and strategies which address

host root causes a, develop plans aimed at resolving or mitigating specific obstacles, and coordinate the implementation of the various programs aligned with the policy.

What Centers bring to a fragile state is important because care must be taken to avoid creating an organization which becomes an end in itself – a self-licking ice cream cone so to speak. The ultimate purpose of each Center is to set the conditions for its departure from the host country, and not become overly committed to success, to the point it loses perspective. In this sense, Centers serve as the vehicle for the eventual transition of responsibilities to the host government. As a caveat, Centers must avoid creating dependency between the host nation and donors. Similarly, Centers should not see themselves as the host nation's salvation, creating the belief that withdrawal will lead to the political or economic collapse. Both conditions are a recipe for eventual state failure.

The appropriate officials from the federal level Center should meet with their host nation counterparts to create an informal contract, establishing a cooperative roadmap for assistance (i.e., timetables, guidelines, and programs). Centers are the vehicle for self-help, but if the host nation cannot or will not assume responsibility, then the stated policy should be the withdrawal of all Centers until the host government (or its successor) is willing to meet its obligations. Withdrawal is always a difficult (and political) decision, especially after the investment of substantial time, money, and resources into the enterprise, so the President (or UN Secretary General) should empower the federal level Center director with the authority to withdraw. For this reason, even before the Centers arrive, the appropriate representative (e.g., ambassador,

UN special envoy, etc.) should sit with the host nation chief executive and review the roadmap for the Centers.

### **Creating Synergist Effects through the Integrated Decision-making Process**

The core of each center is its strategic thinking mechanism. According to Rich Yarger, strategic thinking comprises five competencies—critical thinking, systems thinking, creative thinking, thinking in time, and ethical thinking.<sup>18</sup> Each competency is important for policy and strategy formulation. For an in-depth examination of strategic thinking, Rich Yarger's *Strategy and the National Security Professional*, and Colin Gray's *Modern Strategy* are excellent resources. The product of strategic thinking is policy and strategy articulated as goals, resources, and methods (ends, ways, and means). Moreover, each policy or strategy decision must be tested for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability.

The mechanism mobilizes the decision-making process in pursuit of the following: 1) permit the orderly input, discussion, and integration of issues and ideas into policy papers for Council consideration; 2) establish a forum in which policy and strategy are scrutinized, debated, and developed in an unequivocal, definitive matter; and 3) coordinate and assist with the implementation of directives as well as providing a feedback mechanism for the Center's attention. The federal level Center develops policy and strategy, whereas subordinate Centers refer to this policy and strategy for development of lower level strategy and planning. To be clear, the integrated staffing process seeks to harmonize the interactions associated with

Whole of Government and the Comprehensive approaches so as to establish rational, consistent policies and strategy. On one hand, the process is complicated and subject to immense friction. But on the other hand, attempting to develop policy and strategy in an ad hoc, disjointed manner exchanges the complex for chaos and cosmetic solutions.

The director has the enormous task of making the integrated decision-making process function. The principal and immediate task of the director is to create a corporate body from the various and diverse donors engaged in the enterprise. Promoting teamwork is accomplished through the inclusive atmosphere fostered by the interagency process. Realistically, not all personalities are suited for teamwork, so selection of key personnel is critical. Since the selection process is not infallible, the director should have the authority to remove people who are incorrigible, parochial, or disruptive. On a similar note, pessimism and disparaging remarks about people or organizations are contagious and poison relations. The director must exude confidence and optimism, and demand subordinates follow suit. In this regard, challenges and problems must be addressed as objectives rather than insurmountable obstacles.

As the prime mover of all Center activities, the choice of Center director requires careful consideration. In that directors must translate higher policy into concrete plans and implementation, they should possess acute executive management skills. For the federal-level Center, the director should be a retired senior grade officer or former governor due to the political and strategic responsibilities of the position. For subordinate Centers, retired field grade officers and former mayors have the requisite skills to manage

planning and implementation of policy and strategy.<sup>19</sup>

Proper recruitment in terms of advertising the position, salary and benefits, and interviews is essential for placing quality executives as directors. An executive management course for selected leaders provides the basis for work requirements. At the federal-level Center, the director's main focus is to ensure the staffing process provides him with integrated information for policy and strategy formulation. At subordinate level Centers, directors focus more on planning and implementation of higher policy and strategy.

In appearance and action, the Center is both impartial and non-partisan so that cultural differences among organizations and government agencies are mollified to the point that cooperation and coordination can occur. The Center should encourage key organizations to provide representatives, offering office space with official internet accounts and accommodations in the camp. Having a secure place to work, sleep, conduct hygiene, and associate with others during off duty hours is an effective way to build working relationships. Most important, the Center should encourage key host nation government officials to come to the camp weekly to meet privately with mentors, functional experts, and conduct research on the internet. These visits do not replace the normal mentor visits to their counterparts, but they do provide a respite from the machinations of their government bureaucracy and may accelerate the transition to host government ownership.

The integrated decision-making mechanism is the Center's locomotion that gives its meetings true relevance and means for action. Without a well designed decision-making mechanism, meetings become nothing more than exchanges of information. Now, in-

formation by itself does nothing if there is no way to make use of it. The mechanism's effectiveness hinges on organizational structure, processes, and procedures to foster thorough preparation of integrated issue papers for discussion, to establish a staff routine to manage the workload, to provide the key advisors and decision-makers with the time to reflect before acting on policy, and to provide the Center with a way to monitor implementation of policies and programs as well as assisting in coordination.

In view of their different responsibilities and roles, the federal-level Center focuses on policy and strategy development, while subordinate Centers focus on lower level strategy, planning, and implementation. Nevertheless, the decision-making mechanism for all remains essentially the same. Structurally, the mechanism comprises the integrated planning board, the council, and the implementation coordination board. The integrated planning board, the council, implementation coordination board, and supporting staff represent the brain trust of the Center. The personnel comprising these bodies are dedicated to making the decision-making process function as designed, so success hinges on their ability to work as a team.

**Integrated Planning Board.** The integrated planning board prepares policy and strategy issues for the council to review and debate. The composition of the board depends largely on the Center's mission (e.g., DDR, SSR, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Response). Board members should be deputies to the principal advisors sitting on the council. Board members must have the authority to request information from their parent organizations (i.e., U.S. federal government, UN, and head offices) in the development of written products. The deputies keep their princi-

pal bosses apprised of progress on issues so they are aware of the other perspectives, disagreements, and challenges that arise during the process.

The development of papers for council consideration is not a bureaucratic paper drill. First, the integrated staff process and discussions within the board harmonize the diverse organizational terms and concepts into a common vocabulary, perhaps one of the most important and difficult, but worthwhile, tasks of the board. Coming to a common understanding of words, acronyms, and concepts avoids misunderstandings, ambiguity, and confusion. The board should use the following truism of bureaucracy: *that which can be misinterpreted, will be.*

Second, the process of integrating ideas, viewpoints, and guidance into papers sparks debate, bargaining, and compromise below the council level. If the deputies can reach consensus regarding a course of action, they can forward the paper to the council for review and agreement. If the disagreements cannot be resolved, then the paper should list the points of disagreement in parallel columns for the council to debate and resolve. Needless to say, the deputies are continuously conferring with their parent organization and the council principals during this process, so all concerned with a certain policy or strategy are educated on the issues at hand and able to provide input.

Third, the board provides the council with papers in an orderly and measured manner, perhaps three to four papers per council meeting. Additionally, papers should have a concise standard format for ease of reading and gleaning of important facts. Generally, the format might be organized as follows: general background, goals, courses of action, estimated costs, and relevant supporting documents. The general

background section is drawn from pertinent intelligence as well as executive summaries of studies. The objectives section articulates the specific issue goals, ensuring they are aligned with higher level objectives. The courses-of-action section articulates detailed guidance for implementation. This section will likely be area where most disagreements emerge and hence the focus of debate. An appendix on anticipated costs establishes a paper trail for expenditures, forcing the Centers to focus on the budget and advising the host government on anticipated costs. Finally, attached supporting documents provide greater details to consider during the council discussions.

Fourth, the integrated planning board has an exhausting work schedule, with established meetings three times weekly so as to provide polished papers to the Center council. Board members expend substantial time requesting information or guidance as well as keeping their bosses and parent organizations informed. Due to sensitivities, it would be more prudent not to have military personnel actively involved in producing papers. However, a few military representatives (e.g., Civil Affairs, engineers, and intelligence) should be present at the meetings to provide the military perspective. The military should attach a formal military statement to each policy paper on the security implications and requirements.

Fifth, the entire integrated decision-making process needs a coordinator who supervises the running of both boards and the council. The integrated process coordinator chairs the integration planning board, so as to manage the long term schedule for policy papers, serve as the honest broker during discussions, supervise the production of papers, and keep the director apprised of all pertinent issues and points for the up-



coming council meeting. The coordinator distributes upcoming papers to council members for review 48 hours prior to the scheduled council meeting.

**The Council.** The council comprises the director (chairman) and the core principal advisors. Although predicated on the type of mission, generally, the principal advisors include representatives from the State Department, USAID, Department of Agriculture, UN, Engineers, Civil Affairs, and other donor representatives as appropriate (e.g., NGOs, IOs). The host nation government's executive (e.g., president, prime minister, or governor) should attend the weekly meetings as well. While it is important that the host government understand the reasoning behind decisions, its executive should also be exposed to the interagency-like process and the conduct of meetings.

The director may open the meeting by having a designated security analyst from the integrated support staff provide a short situation update. Although the director chairs the meetings, the process coordinator acts as the manager so as to facilitate the agenda. As such, the coordinator introduces each issue paper, summarizing the issues and highlighting the disagreements. The sleek format and early distribution of the papers educates the members of the issues at hand to prompt informed discussion. The coordinator recognizes members to speak (with the tacit approval of the director), and places a time limit on individual viewpoints so as to facilitate the discourse. When the discussion has run its course, the coordinator summarizes what has been discussed, the areas of agreement, and the areas of disagreement. If agreement has been reached regarding policy or strategy action, the director may verbalize his decision on the spot.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the coordinator summarizes the discussion and the decisions made. The verbal review reinforces what has transpired at the meeting and permits participants to ask for clarifications. Experience suggests that misunderstandings often arise if no verbal summary is given. After the meeting, the coordinator produces a written policy action directive for council members to review and comment on before the director signs it into policy. In this manner, decisions and the background context are firmly fixed in the minds of the participants.

Incidentally, for contentious issues or irreconcilable differences within the council, the director bears the burden of decision, knowing full well that many officials will remain dissatisfied with a decision and continue to argue their points. A technique that the director might use is to make decisions on contentious issues outside of the council. The director can retain freedom of action by discussing the issue with an inner circle of advisors and then weigh the alternatives in private before making a decision. Resorting to an inner circle for discussing sensitive issues also minimizes the risk of premature leaks. Regardless of the decision process, the director has the coordinator produce a policy action directive (as before) and distribute it among the council members for review and comment. In this manner, council members will know that their viewpoints received a fair hearing even if they were not accepted in part or whole.

The size of a meeting should generally be limited to around 15 people in order to foster an intimate atmosphere, where advisors can speak frankly and comfortably without fear of their views being leaked. However, the director can occasionally invite outside specialists to council meetings to provide greater ex-

pertise for the deliberations. This membership ceiling should not preclude the use of experts, consultation committees, or the like from presenting their views for specific issues. Outside expertise brings fresh perspectives and greater depth to policy challenges, so it should be sought out whenever feasible. Often times, visiting experts can brief their studies to the council, which can debate the issue in private. Ultimately, the coordinator is responsible for controlling the number of participants but is only authorized to expand the membership at the request of the director.

**Implementation Coordination Board.** Like the integrated planning board, the members of the implementation coordination board should be deputies to the principal advisors sitting on the council. Board members must have the authority to assist and coordinate actions for the policy or strategy implementers. Coordination involves informing relevant government agencies and donor organizations of a policy project and persuading them to assist the lead agency on a policy project. The implementation coordination board also has the task of ensuring the policy directive does not conflict or undermine existing policy or new policy from higher echelons.

Although the implementation coordination board monitors and reports back to the council on the progress of policy projects, it should not be used to prod or demand results from government agencies and donor organizations. Rather, it should be perceived as an agent for assistance rather than a bureaucratic oppressor. The board also serves as a conduit for feedback from the field to the integrated planning board and to the council, either for good ideas (best practices) or obstacles encountered in the implementation of a policy project. If success is to be achieved, the council

must understand why something is not working and consider corrective actions.

**Integrated Support Staff.** The integrated support staff provides administrative and some subject matter expertise to the integrated planning board, council and implementation coordination board. The staff should comprise around fifty functional and geographic experts, producing issue papers, policy and strategy directives, and special projects. Their functional and geographic expertise assists in the development of issue papers in addition to integrating the ideas of policy board members. Care should be taken that the staff does not replace or marginalize the policy board members in terms of considering all ideas and viewpoints. The chief of staff and the coordinator ensure the staff remains in its lane. Additionally, the staff reviews and prepares new ideas for the interagency coordinator to schedule on the agenda. The chief of staff serves as the coordinator's deputy and attends all planning board and council meetings.

## **Processing Policy and Strategy Ideas**

The council for the federal-level Center most often begins the interagency process with a review of a UN strategic assessment, UN Mission Concept, or perhaps a country team assessment. Theoretically, one of these documents provides the broad guidance for the development of ends, ways, and means concerning Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The federal-level Center provides the subordinate Centers (i.e., provincial or city) with policy and strategy directives as a catalyst for them to formulate supporting strategy and planning.

As operations and programs begin to mature, practitioners can provide feedback on progress, problems, local solutions, and general feedback through the appropriate Center's implementation coordination board. This process serves as an important source for new policy ideas and refinements to strategy. Of course, ideas which arise from discussions in the Council, the integrated planning board, or the implementation coordination board can be submitted to the support staff for the integrated planning board to examine. At times, an issue or cluster of issues may be too complex for the Councils to consider properly. The authority to request the specialized perspectives of experts, academics, or analysts can provide a tremendous service, either as individuals or as part of a study committee. The point is, the interagency process is not a closed system, churning out policy decrees without thought. For practical solutions to problems, Centers must serve as clearing houses for innovative solutions.

To emphasize, at the interpersonal level, the inclusive nature of generating policy ideas fosters a sense of teamwork and accomplishment. People are more apt to support a policy if they are part of the process, particularly if their ideas are embraced in the process. Even if their ideas are not incorporated, people have the satisfaction that their ideas are given a fair hearing. Camaraderie develops naturally as a result of working together over an extended time. This is not to say that personal frictions won't arise, that is highly improbable, but working within a group creates familiarity which helps overcome cultural barriers, differences in vocabulary, and prejudices.

The interagency system permits the director to retain flexibility with policy and strategy as well as

shielding him from political sniping and ex parte attempts to influence decisions. By officially discussing policy issues only in the council forum, it is much more difficult for people to influence decisions through furtive encounters. On the other hand, the director is free to meet informally with whomever for advice. The inclusive, integrated nature of developing policy and strategy opens all sides of the argument for council members to consider, so when the director makes a decision, it is exceedingly difficult for critics to describe the policy as arbitrary or parochial. Some issues will be too sensitive for an early commitment, so the director can use the process to delay the decision (i.e., calling for the formation of a committee to study the matter more) as a means to following a hazardous course.

## **Policy and Strategy Considerations**

As Centers begin developing policy and strategy, they must remain sensitive to the implications and multi-ordered effects of decisions. Policy and strategy formulation must address the specific strategic effects desired. Solutions which address only the immediate problem tend not to consider possible unintended consequences. Good intentions are not a justification for programs. Accordingly, the Center council and director must study the potential impact of policy and strategy on the political structure, society, the economy, rule of law, and security institutions. An overriding principle by which all Centers should abide is "First, Do No Harm." The following paragraphs touch on some considerations the council and director should bear in mind when deliberating on policy and strategy.

**Security Sector Reform.** By definition Security Sector Reform (SSR) is “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.”<sup>20</sup>

By implication, security sector reform involves policy and strategy at the highest levels as well as the subordinate strategies, plans, and programs in support. It is critical to bear in mind that although SSR is highly intrusive in the domestic affairs of a state, it is initiated at the request of the host country and designed as a self-help mechanism. Security sector reform deals primarily with four areas of collaboration – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR); Rule of Law; Military Reform; and Police Reform. As a matter of practice, the federal level Center should deploy first to the country’s capital in order to engage the host government in the planning and formulation of policy and strategy. Thereafter, the number of subordinate Centers needed is contingent on the mission, which in turn is shaped by the geographic size of the host country, the population, and the access to remote areas. Building confidence and cooperation with the host government largely depends on the degree to which the international assistance effort is organized and ready to begin work. Government Assistance Centers can provide this capability because they are structured to deepen cooperation and coordination among donors as well as between donors and the host nation.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.** Although Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is a subset of Security Sector Reform, it serves as the primary driver. It follows logically that if DDR falters, progress in SSR is likely to stagnate. Ideally, DDR does not begin until after a peace agreement between the host government and rebels is in effect. Be-


cause implementation of a lasting peace is contingent on trust, the host government requests UN assistance with implementation. The challenges inherent in DDR militate against an ad hoc, under-resourced intervention, though that is the traditional UN approach.<sup>21</sup>

Government Assistance Centers can mitigate common problems with DDR through better coordination of effort, providing comprehensive progress reports to donors, and adapting policy and strategy to the changing situation. As a matter of pragmatism, a minimum of three Centers should oversee DDR, with the federal level Center interacting with the transitional government and establishing the joint monitoring committee for the ceasefire and peace agreement as well as the national commissions for DDR, elections, truth and reconciliation. The subordinate DDR Centers administer the DDR cantonments directly (Figure 5). It is worth noting that the Center should represent neutral ground for all factions in order to foster greater trust in the proceedings. The Center does not have command and control over the UN security forces, so liaison officers might be desirable to improve situational awareness and greater coordination.

As obvious as it may seem, the task of the federal level Center is to determine the multi-order effects of conducting DDR if no peace agreement is in the making or if no security forces are immediately available to fill the security vacuum. Note that the conflict in Afghanistan became more acute in part due to a premature execution of DDR. There was no peace agreement or surrender on the part of the Taliban government, so only the Afghan Militia Forces (mostly from the Northern Alliance) started DDR at the end of 2003. It should have been no surprise (although it apparently was) that the Taliban, criminal organizations, and lo-



cal power brokers seeped into the security vacuum. Thus, a peace agreement and the availability of police for the local communities are key factors for the initiation of DDR.



**Figure 5. Centers Supporting DDR**


The subordinate Centers focus on the DDR activities for the government forces and the anti-government forces respectively. As a prudent measure, a zone of separation is established in the ceasefire, so each Center should be located where it can implement DDR most effectively (but not in the zone of separation). The DDR Centers have the daunting task of processing former combatants through one or more cantonments. Time and action are critical components during the ceasefire, so each Center needs to supervise

the swift construction of cantonments, which like the Center camps should have a uniform design for ease of construction. Cantonments should also exploit new technologies with barrier and shelter systems so they may be constructed swiftly and wherever needed (Figure 6).<sup>22</sup> As a practical matter, former combatants safeguard and run their own cantonments with the DDR personnel organizing the process. Former combatants should be employed and paid for camp construction, operations, and maintenance as a means to keep them occupied even before DDR processing begins. Some key considerations for cantonment design highlight the complexities of DDR:

- Weapon storage facility
- Weapons turn-in point for weapons earmarked for destruction
- In-processing facility to determine the status of former combatants (e.g., war service, medical, personal data, etc.)
- Barracks for single males
- Barracks for single females
- Barracks for families, segregated by whole, single parents, adolescent parents, and pregnancies.
- Barracks for male child soldiers
- Barracks for female child soldiers
- Barracks for handicapped or severely injured soldiers

- Male and female Lavatories
- Medical facility
- School house
- Vocational and life skills training facility
- Workshop
- Multifunctional facility (e.g., worship, truth and reconciliation hearings, social events, etc.)
- Dining facility
- Sports field (doubles as ceremony parade ground)

The weapon storage facility is a confidence-building measure for each faction. If the cantonment commanders agree to have the facility locked, they retain possession of the key. DDR personnel encourage the turn-in of excess or specific weapons/munitions for destruction. As a caveat, there should be no cash-for-weapons program since this may subvert the DDR process. The turn-in point for weapons and munitions earmarked for destruction should be outside of the cantonment and far enough away for safe detonation. Only specialists (unexploded ordinance or engineers) should destroy munitions.



### Figure 6. DDR Cantonment

The in-processing facility serves to determine the status of former combatants. DDR personnel need to verify individual claims of service, including those who provided service support or are family members of soldiers. DDR personnel must deal with the delicate issue of sex slaves, forced marriages, and child soldiers. Some females of forced marriages may wish to remain with their spouses and others will not. Former sex slaves may not wish to return to their village due to the cultural stigma, so DDR personnel may need to find a relative in another village willing to take them in. DDR personnel also must determine whether villages want child soldiers back (some child soldiers have done horrendous things, so it becomes a consideration) or else find a relative in another village.

Medical exams are essential in view of the rampant cases of sexually transmitted diseases, infectious illnesses, injuries, and disabilities. In view of the potential numbers requiring medical care, a surge of medical personnel (ideally from the host nation) may be required during the initial period. Quarantine barracks may be required for contagious people, which in turn expands the number of medical personnel needed for care.

The segregation of former combatants within the cantonment has positive implications. It helps weaken the grip rebel commanders have on their soldiers, especially child soldiers. Segregation cuts down on sexual-related incidents and predatory practices. Families (particularly very young parents) can provide greater support to each other in this environment as well. In this manner, former soldiers gradually begin to take charge of their lives rather than taking orders from their former commanders.

Handicapped soldiers may require barracks accommodating their disability (e.g., entrance ramps, wider living spaces, modified lavatory plumbing fixtures, etc.) as well as being fitted with prosthetic limbs and the like.

Because child soldiers have had their education interrupted for years, school becomes a critical factor in their rehabilitation since it is a symbolic return to normalcy. Additionally, special counseling for child soldiers may be warranted to determine if they are suffering from psychological problems, such as post traumatic stress disorder among other syndromes.

Adult vocational training must reflect the economy of the country, reflect the soldier's likely and potential, and not flood the market with specific vocations. For instance, teaching carpentry in a country of adobe buildings is hardly useful; a soldier may earnestly aspire to be a mechanical engineer, but he must get an education first; and training an army of masons will hardly make this vocation a viable livelihood. Similarly, soldiers require life skills training so they may function in society. Skills like cooking, paying for items in a store, applying for a job, and maintaining a household help them make the transition to a normal life.

The workshop is useful for putting newly trained skills to use. As such, former combatants can make improvements and repairs to the cantonment, keep them occupied, and reinforce the skills they have recently acquired. Constant improvements to the camp create pride in accomplishments and can serve as the basis for former combatants to start up their own businesses.

A garden permits DDR trainers to instruct on farming techniques. Likewise, a barn might also be built

to teach husbandry and other related programs. DDR personnel should be chary of equipment and techniques which the society cannot sustain or maintain properly. Simple equipment and techniques are more practical. DDR personnel might explore assisting new farmers acquire land in their village areas as well.

As a capstone to these programs, DDR trainers should offer tools and material for sale to the graduates, not to make a profit, but to instill a sense of value in the items. This study examines this idea at the end of the section.

The multifunctional facility should be viewed as a place for religious and social interaction. If possible and culturally acceptable, things like board games, arts and crafts, and other activities encourage former soldiers and their families to interact in a social manner. The truth and reconciliation trials are essential for the rehabilitation of soldiers who have committed atrocities. DDR personnel do not pass judgment on soldiers suspected of committing atrocities; the facility provides a venue for the UN and the host nation to address these issues in a neutral environment. To this end, mobile courts from the responsible Center visits the cantonment to conduct the trials.

The dining facility permits former combatants to practice their culinary skills under the supervision of their vocational trainers. This type of work is classified as multi-purpose in that running a kitchen involves interrelated skill sets (e.g., inventory, ordering or shopping, menu preparation, nutrition, meal preparation, kitchen maintenance, sanitation, etc.). If approached properly, the dining facility can become one of the most important places for various aspects of vocational training to come together, and a place run almost entirely by former soldiers.

The sports field permits former soldiers to channel their energy through organized activities. DDR personnel need only to organize teams, explain the game rules to the referees, and provide the equipment. The sports field also doubles as a ceremony field. Ceremonies are exceedingly important in most cultures, providing a sense of importance to the individual. *DDR personnel must provide certificates to individuals for every accomplishment* (vocational and life skills training, sports champions, best barracks, best culinary activity, DDR processing, etc.). Above all else, DDR personnel absolutely need the capability to design and produce certificates rapidly.

The aforementioned passages only address some of the complexities associated with DDR and serve to underscore the necessity of organization. One of the frustrations associated with DDR is the issue of funding. The federal level Center council should remain alert to funding issues during the DDR process. Donors may curtail or stop funding for a variety of reasons, so the council must exploit ways to maximize funding while it exists. A post-conflict opportunity may capture the UN's attention today, only to be forgotten a few months later by a new crisis – money and resources are always limited. If the Center can legitimately reduce expenses without undercutting DDR objectives, then it might be able to continue DDR programs to fruition.

**Rule of Law.** Arguably, Rule of Law issues may have the greatest strategic impact on the stability of the host nation, starting with the federal constitution.<sup>23</sup> The constitution is the social contract between the central government and the citizens. However, it is not enough for the social contract to guarantee the protection of inalienable rights. As the American



Founding Fathers recognized, democratic political systems often fail due to the confluence of innate human imperfections and the insatiable quest for power. Invariably this combination erodes freedom to the point that a tyranny emerges. At this point, a cycle of tyranny, rebellion, and anarchy ensues that is not easily broken. Thus, in order for sovereignty to remain vested in the people, a structure system of checks and balances is provident. The separation of political institutions (i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial) sharing powers is necessary to prevent the accumulation of power in any one branch. Structurally, each branch needs the concurrence or involvement of at least one other branch to conduct the business of government. Similarly, limiting the power of the federal government by devolving all power not specifically vested in the central government to local governments and the individual is just as important. The implications of limited federal government are profound. Except for national security threats, local government and individuals are responsible for local security and self-protection respectively. Paradoxically, guaranteeing the right of self-preservation through an armed populace serves to quell predatory practices of criminals. Local government officials are more accountable to their communities as well as responsible for services and social reform when they are elected from below and not through appointments from above.

Theoretically, if the political system stands as a sentinel to individual freedoms, there should be no need to provide a listing of rights; but if citizens demand a listing of rights as insurance against encroaching government, they should be limited only to inalienable rights (i.e., property, self preservation, and free speech) and avoid utopian declarations. Compare the

logic of the inalienable rights to property and to free speech with the utopian rights to education and not to live in poverty. In view of the specialized nature of crafting a constitution, the federal level Center should deploy with constitutional scholars to work closely with host nation officials in the creation of an enduring social contract. These scholars must report back to the UN on their satisfaction or concerns with the constitution. Structural flaws which have a negative impact on the separation of powers must be noted and tied to the future funding of programs.

Judicial reform requires a holistic, long-term program. A balance among law enforcement, the court system, and detention operations is essential; a weakness in one militates against a solid system of law and order. Accordingly, judicial reform takes years to function in ways that do not violate individual rights. A dysfunctional criminal justice system seriously undermines the underpinnings of society if graft, bribery, intimidation, and murder supplant justice. In such an environment, societal reaction can be highly destabilizing with mob rule, vigilantism, and vengeance creating a cycle of continual violence. Judicial reform exemplifies the interconnectivity of SSR nodes, since a weakness here has an immediate deleterious impact on the other programs. Subordinate Centers can assist judicial reform effectively by providing office space for legal experts, human rights lawyers, and mentors. Centers might serve as a secure venue for mobile courts for adjudicating legal cases in dangerous areas.

**Police Reform.** Police reform is complex in that it consists of so many diverse roles and responsibilities (i.e., national, border, specialty, and community). Unlike military reform, a prevalent police presence is urgent and immediate. Determining the number of

police required for sufficient societal order and stability becomes a primary task of the Centers. A general planning guide suggests 2.5 policemen per thousand residents, but not all policemen are alike.<sup>24</sup> However, the prevalent idea of mass producing national police resembles a nostrum to a complex societal instrument for law and order. National police undercut the principle of limited government and can be used to extend the arbitrary power of the central government. It is not without reason that authoritarian governments are often called police states.

Creating community police forces through local recruitment and service helps limit corruption, predatory practices, and collusion with criminals by policemen. Policemen who grew up in a community are less likely to bring shame on the family under this arrangement. Moreover, locally elected provincial and district chiefs of police are more responsible to their constituents than to the central government, serving to reinforce separation of powers. The planning figure of 2.5 policemen per thousand residents determines the size of the community police forces. Admittedly, community police are not as efficient as national police in terms of centralized command and control, but they lead to fewer systematic abuses of power. Centers should invest in police mentor teams, which are tasked with recruiting, organizing, equipping, initial training, and paying community police. Formal training for selected leaders and eventually the entire community police force should be conducted in phases thereafter. Exigencies (e.g., insurgencies, failed states, or ungoverned regions) may require the temporary reliance on existing militias so as to maintain security. The topic of militias is always politically sensitive because of alleged atrocities or crimes. In the

final analysis, the policy on militias must take into account the consequences of a security vacuum on local communities.

National police should form a small percentage of the overall law enforcement requirement. Logically, they are most effective in the capital and large cities to serve as a back-up to community police. Highway, border, and specialty police (i.e., counter-narcotics, SWAT, federal investigators, etc.) require extensive formal training, so police reform strategy needs to take a long term view of professionalizing law enforcement.

Corruption among policemen is to be expected. Police mentors need policy guidelines on which levels of corruption are not tolerated (red lines) and which levels are deferred until later. Building rapport between mentors and their counterparts is an effective way to build trust and to address corruption issues. Because corruption is often a sensitive issue, gaining trust rather than lecturing is the preferable when seeking a reduction of corruption to manageable levels.

**Military Reform.** The establishment of military institutions requires a thorough analysis of the country's national security policy, which generally identifies threats, national interests, and strategic objectives. Foremost among its missions is protecting the nation state from external invasion. As a rule of thumb, the military is a blunt instrument against insurgent forces and should be used sparingly. In principle, the first line of defense against inchoate insurgent forces and criminal gangs is the police with the military providing back-up or securing again an area that insurgents have seized.

A primary source of information and expertise is the agency which administers Security Force Assis-

tance (e.g., Office of Military Cooperation or the Embassy Security Assistance Office), so a representative at the Center will prove invaluable military reform issues.

Determining the size, composition, and distribution of the military is a matter of staff work by national security professionals and strategists. The process has long term ramifications. A military force, which exceeds adequate levels of defense, can create a security dilemma with its neighbors. Additionally, exorbitant military expenditures constrain a free market economy. It is well to remember President Eisenhower's warning about excessive defense spending in the name of national security—a bankrupt country is a defenseless country. Using the national security policy as the foundational document, the country's ministry of defense develops strategic defense planning documents, such as the national military strategy, defense planning guidance, and defense capabilities planning guidance. This is a long, laborious, and iterative process, which takes years before a balanced, rational defense policy is attained. This does not mean the establishment of the military institution is held in abeyance until the defense planning documents have gone through the first iteration. The foundation of any army lies in the infantry branch, so populating the new army initially with infantry units will not create an imbalance in the final armed forces. When appropriate, other branches (i.e., armor, artillery, engineers, signal, intelligence, etc.) as well as other services (i.e., coast guard and air force) can fill out the armed forces proportionately. An important point when dealing with the host nation is the common desire for the latest weapons. As a casual observation, it seems like everyone wants prestigious weapon systems but they

don't want to maintain them. In Afghanistan, bone-yards comprising thousands of rusting armored vehicles, helicopters, and aircraft are a testament of giving a nation state what it wants and not what it needs for adequate national security. The strategic defense planning documents are the most effective way to keep the host nation ministry of defense grounded.

Of greater import is creating a professional, disciplined force. Training is essential but by no means indicative of how the military will perform in the field, especially when the host nation is beset by an insurgency. *The military must have the freedom to fail* for this is the only way it can learn, cultivate innovation, recognize good leaders, and become an independent institution. Against this necessary maturation, a countervailing tendency among trainers not to risk committing the fledgling forces to decisive combat may occur. In part, this hesitancy may be the connection between a unit's performance and the trainer's competency. Another part could be the McClellan syndrome—the famous Civil War general who built a magnificent army but eschewed decisive battle out of fear of attrition. Center councils must arrest these proclivities early or risk creating a parade-ground army. This holds particularly true for planning, command and control, and sustaining the force for major operations against insurgents. The freedom to fail means the military can suffer a defeat, perhaps a rout in the process. It is under these circumstances that the gifted leaders come to the forefront, the errors in planning and execution become apparent, and logistical snags corrected. No magic formula or blueprint exists that has universal application with standing up new armies, but finding a balance is a necessary consideration.

Military educational institutions serve to professionalize the military. Basic training, career courses, noncommissioned officer courses, officer candidate courses or academies, command and general staff courses, and senior service colleges all develop and build military skills and thinking. At a suitable time, the federal level Center develops the military education system policy in conjunction with retired military professionals recruited as advisors. In like manner, the UN can recruit retired officers and noncommissioned officers to serve as faculty for these courses, academies, and colleges until such time as the host nation military can assume responsibility.

**Economic Reform.** One of the key, immediate tasks of the federal level Center is to formulate an economic strategy for the host nation. Economic vitality is a critical component of a state's national security because an impoverished country susceptible to predatory actors and generally a source of regional instability. The strategic economic goal is to have the federal government recognize wealth creation as a national interest.<sup>25</sup> The central theme of the economic strategy is to foster a growing middle class in the country, giving the lower classes a standard of living to aspire to. One way to this end is fostering local economies to generate wealth rather than a centralized run economy. The power elite will no doubt resist this approach since little economic aid and funding will trickle through the layers of government, meaning fewer opportunities for corruption. This reaction is only logical; money is the wellspring of power, so powerbrokers want access to government contracts and aid. By using the subordinate Centers as the means to providing assistance and development, donors can avoid rancorous negotiations with host nation officials. Subordinate Centers can manage local

economic assistance programs through small business loans, acting as watchdog for activities which undermine the local economy, and monitoring the levels of taxation. It is essential that the host nation not view Centers as cash cows, spending money profligately. Likewise, providing free items, such as tools, utensils, and seeds to the population can have negative multiordered effects; it cannot help but weaken the local economy; plus, the recipients will not value the items to the same degree they would had they purchased them. Inasmuch as few people can afford these things, Centers can provide money loans for their purchase. On the face of it, loaning money appears an unnecessary step, but the process gives value to the items in the mind of the purchaser. Moreover, recording the loans makes it more difficult for individuals to take the commodities and sell them. The loan recipients can repay the loan with commodities, which the Center can provide to others as appropriate.

Construction projects can be a boon for local communities with a few caveats. First, only pursue projects the community needs and wants (consultation). Second, employ local labor only for these projects. Using outside contractors for labor may be more convenient, but the local community does not gain the full economic benefit. Third, be prepared to provide on-the-job training for local laborers. Most illiterate people learn by show and hands-on training, so they are fast learners in that sense. Last, build only those projects that the local community can sustain after the Center departs. This means, the local community must have the capability, the will, and the resources to maintain the finished product.



**Humanitarian Assistance.** Humanitarian Assistance should be limited in scope and duration. If not monitored and managed, Humanitarian Assistance through the provision of consumer goods can easily disrupt local economies and create counterproductive dependencies between the population and the international community. Humanitarian Assistance makes most sense when applied in conjunction with disaster response, a calamity which has disrupted normal commerce and endangers lives. Nevertheless, once the immediate crisis has passed, the Centers must inform the affected authorities that Humanitarian Assistance will end at a certain date.

**Disaster Response.** It might be that in Disaster Response, the Centers could have the greatest impact. The federal level Center can deploy quickly to engage the host nation in determining initial needs and the most effective places for subordinate Centers. Shortly thereafter, the subordinate Centers deploy to provide the needed material assistance. It is during Disaster Response that the deployment of standardized Centers with assigned interagency personnel underscores their value to the international community. The capability to deploy Centers, set up a secure camp within days, organize the Humanitarian Assistance effort, and distribute aid in an orderly and secure manner should not lie only in the realm of the military. Experience suggests that enough Centers deploy to keep refugee camps (perhaps using the cantonment design) as manageable as possible. What the donors want to avoid is a convergence of millions of refugees in certain areas, such as a country's major cities. Proper dispersion of people reduces the threat of epidemics, disease due to inadequate hygiene, and mass disorders. The first order of business is to stop the dying, so

determining the immediate needs (e.g., water, food, shelter, security, etc.) becomes paramount.

**Counterinsurgency.** Centers need not assume a military character even in an insurgency. As long as there are military camps which can come to the assistance of Centers, private security personnel are sufficient for immediate protection. Even during an insurgency, Centers can provide Security Sector Reform throughout the echelons of government. It is during the hold and build phases that Centers provide the greatest service to a counterinsurgency strategy. The various advisor and mentor teams, construction and development elements, and capacity building personnel *inter alia* can stage from Centers, complementing the security gains of the counterinsurgents.

### **Concept-to-Practice Considerations**

Government Assistance Centers offer an opportunity for all donor states and organizations, large and small, to make effective contributions to the assistance and development of fragile states. Under the auspices of the United Nations, prospective donor states may volunteer to contribute personnel, resources, and land for the stationing of cadre Centers in key regions of the world to train and prepare until deployed under a UN mandate.

A designated UN department (e.g., Department of Peacekeeping Operations) can manage the program: assigning geographic regions to specific Centers for the development of assessments and contingency planning; designating the federal level Centers; and coordinating the locations of home stations of Centers within designated countries. Additionally, the UN department manages personnel and equipment

requirements, hosting donor conferences with contributing nation representatives attending. Ideally, nationality considerations should not affect manning requirements, but initially, Centers will likely have a lead-nation character until they become established. Eventually, the program might evolve from donor state contributions to advertising job positions and hiring the most qualified people. This approach might result in fewer personnel turnovers, eliminate the national features of Centers, and result in greater equity of salaries.

To enhance expeditionary capabilities, Centers should have standard deployment packages comprised of quick erection shelters, engineer equipment, generators, vehicles, water purification unit, and the like. Each permanent Center should be located on or near an airbase/airport for rapid deployment. Initially, an excellent resource of knowledge is the U.S. Army, which possesses a wealth of experience on preparation for overseas deployments (e.g., administrative and medical packets, packing lists, and load planning).

Training can be enhanced by after-action reports and conferences, hosted by the director and staff of recently deployed Centers. Personnel from nongovernment organizations and similar entities should be encouraged to participate as well. Along these lines, Centers should develop relationships with organizations that are likely to operate in the same geographic areas. Since ninety percent of cooperation stems from trust, developing relationships is a worthy pursuit.

## Conclusion

Government Assistance Centers are two tiered organizational approach to providing assistance and development to fragile states in a swift, effective, and synchronized manner. Centers are a generational advance from provincial reconstruction teams in that they can perform assistance in remote and insecure regions. The main differences are that they are not military in nature and provide a way for all donor actors to engage the host government in a coordinated and cooperative manner.

The first organizational tier lies in the camp layout. Using standardized camp and cantonment designs in addition to exploiting the latest technological advances in barrier and shelter systems, Government Assistance Centers can deploy and be operational far more quickly than in the past. From a fiscal standpoint, standardized camps make for a more predictable and transparent budget, especially in terms of construction, operations and maintenance costs.

The second organizational tier addresses the mechanism which drives the integrated decision-making process. The inherent flaws in the Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches are ameliorated through an organizational structure which emulates the Eisenhower National Security Council mechanism. Hence, policy and strategy issues undergo thorough study and staff preparation in the integrated planning board; the director and council members are kept apprised of issues raised during the staffing process, so they are well-informed (some would say educated) on the key issues; the council deliberates on policies and strategies, which provide the most efficient and effective assistance for the host nation; lastly, the imple-

mentation coordination board helps the practitioners with coordination of programs as well as providing clarification or additional guidance on decisions. Through this mechanism, Centers are critical thinking organizations, structured to fulfill the unique needs of fragile states. They provide a way for donor states and organizations to interact with the host nation in a coherent and coordinated manner.

Security Sector Reform, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Response are enterprises, requiring a disciplined approach to policy and strategy formulation. In view of their non-military character, Centers engender greater cooperation and trust among donor organizations and between donors and the host government. Primarily, Centers are designed to lift the burden of assistance and development from the military services. Conceptually, all UN member states can contribute to the Centers, thereby spreading the financial burden equitably. Finally, Government Assistance Centers represent a 21<sup>st</sup> century solution to 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges.

## Notes

1. Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 95.

2. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*: FM 3-07 (GPO: October 2008), 1-4, 1-5.

3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), 630.

4. This feat in organization is obscured by President Kennedy's unwarranted dismantling of the Eisenhower NSC mechanism. Though subsequent reforms of the NSC, most notably the George H. W. Bush Administration (1988-1992), have corrected some of the most egregious defects, the NSC mechanism as it now functions cannot rival the Eisenhower NSC.

5. A comprehensive description of the Eisenhower NSC mechanism is available in Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizational History of the National Security Council*, report prepared by James S. Lay Jr. and Robert H. Johnson, 86th Congress, 2d sess., 1960; Incidentally, the United States does employ a form of the interagency process overseas. U.S. embassies rely on country teams, and combatant commands have introduced interagency teams to provide decision makers with integrated products. Yarger, 104-106.

6. Mancur Olson renders a compelling theory on group behavior in *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Wallace Thies provides superb insights into the behavior of NATO alliance partners in *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003).

7. Ambrose describes how discord over landing craft allocations, the Transportation Plan, the invasion of Southern France, and the recognition of de Gaulle as the representative of the French people threatened the success of the Normandy invasion

and subsequent campaign. Stephen E. Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower* (New York: Doubleday & Company, INC., 1970), 295-409.

8. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (GPO: September 2007), 9, <http://us-acac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/07-34/07-34.pdf>.

9. In Europe, Civil Affairs teams are called Civil-Military-Cooperation (CIMIC) teams. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not Sufficient," *DIIS Report 2005: 6* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies Report, 2005), 11.

10. Barbara Stapleton, "The Provincial Reconstruction Team Plan in Afghanistan: A New Direction?" *State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan*, London School of Economics and Political Science and University of Bonn [Conference] (Bonn: May 2003), 5, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28378>, (Accessed August 23, 2010).

11. Jakobsen, 18-19.

12. I lived in an allied PRT in northern Afghanistan for nine months and often visited the other PRTs during the course of my duties. I regarded the soldiers and civilians as dedicated professionals, but noted their governments had not provided them with the necessary resources and responsibilities to fulfill their mission. My knowledge of U.S. PRTs and other allied PRTs is a result of discussions with American officers and noncommissioned officers who operated in PRTs in Regional Commands East and West.

13. Roman camp construction was a feat of organizational genius, which contributed to the development of European cities, <http://www.principialegionis.org/armycamps.html>; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Castra>, (Accessed 29 November, 2010).

14. Camp design adapted from Colonel Russell's study on DDR centers. As Colonel Russell's academic advisor for his paper, I had the opportunity to exchange ideas on camp designs, support centers, and cantonments. Similarities between his paper and this monograph are a result of my edits and our discussion.

Matthew Russell, *The IDDR-SAF Support Centers and Cantonments* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 2011), 18.

15. According to Colonel Russel, traditional camps can take up to six months before they have full operational capability. Russell, 9-17; a number of commercial companies produce a variety of shelters and barriers to meet all camp needs quickly. For a few examples, see <http://www.drash.com/default.aspx>, <http://www.hesco.com/raid/>, <http://www.shelter-systems.com/pre-pareshelters.html>, and <http://www.westernshelter.com/military/browse/category/1>, (Accessed 02 February 2011).

16. The Stability Operations Field Manual provides a basic structure of provincial reconstruction team, which served as a beginning point in this study. FM 3-07, Appendix F.

17. Matt Russell, email interview by the author, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 25 August 2010. Colonel Russell was the 18th Engineer Brigade Commander (TA/CBT) - Senior Engineer MND-N from April 2008 to July 2009.

18. Yarger, 12-14.

19. Although active duty field grade officers (lieutenant colonel and colonel) normally possess mid-management executive skills, their military status and career track would disqualify them. Department of State and USAID officials generally lack the background and training for executive management and leadership

20. FM 3-07, 6-1.

21. I do not intend this as a criticism but as recognition of the conditions UN and NGO agencies face when conducting DDR. The UN handbook, *Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards* is an excellent resource for DDR practitioners, addressing both common challenges and guidelines for action. See <http://www.unddr.org/index.php>.

22. Russell, 23.



23. It is disturbing that the crafting of constitutions appear to be given short shrift in Security Sector Reform. This is not to say constitutions are ignored; they are not. But they are poorly written and fail to establish sufficient checks and balances in the federal government. A comprehensive account of the Founding Fathers' intent with the U.S. political system can be found in W. Cleon Skousen, *The Five Thousand Year Leap: 28 Great Ideas That Changed the World* (Franklin, TN: American Documents Publishing, LLC, 1981, second printing 2009).

24. The International Association of Chiefs of Police gives a general ratio of 2.5 police per 1,000 residents, though warns it is an inappropriate instrument for staffing decisions. In this sense, the ratio is an historical trend. "Police Officer to Population Ratios, Bureau of Justice Statistics Data," *Research Center Directorate Perspectives*, [www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs), (Accessed 11 May 2010.)

25. Two excellent articles addressing pernicious practices with economic assistance and more effective solutions are Carl J. Schramm, "Expeditionary Economics: Spurring Growth After Conflicts and Disasters," *Foreign Affairs*, 89, no 3 (May-June 2010), <http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com/> (Accessed 17 March 2011); Mats Berdal and Nader Mousavizadeh, "Investing for Peace: The Private Sector and the Challenges of Peacebuilding," *Survival*, vol 52, no 2 (April-May 2010): 37-58.

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

**Major General Gregg F. Martin  
Commandant**

**\*\*\*\*\***

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**ISBN: 978-0-9833514-2-9**